

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

Belavia Belarusian Airlines, 14A Nemiga Str., Minsk, Belarus, 220004; Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges

Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2021) ("EAR" or "the Regulations"), I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement ("OEE") to renew the temporary denial order ("TDO") issued in this matter on December 13, 2022. I find that renewal of this order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations.

I. Procedural History

On June 16, 2022, I signed an order denying the export privileges of Belavia Belarusian Airlines ("Belavia") for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order was issued *ex parte* pursuant to section 766.24(a) of the Regulations and was effective upon issuance.² This temporary denial order was subsequently renewed in accordance with section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.³ The renewal order issued on December 13, 2022, and was effective upon issuance.⁴

¹ On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 ("ECRA"). While section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 *et seq.* ("EAA"), (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.* ("IEEPA"), and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5).

² The TDO was published in the *Federal Register* on June 22, 2022 (87 FR 37309).

³ Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods, if it believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be made in writing no later than 20 days before the scheduled expiration date of a temporary denial order.

⁴ The December 16, 2022 renewal order was published in the *Federal Register* on December 19, 2022 (87 FR 77550).

On May 18, 2023, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for renewal of the TDO that was issued on December 13, 2022. The written request was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration. A copy of the renewal request was sent to Belavia in accordance with sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.

II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an "imminent violation" of the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). "A violation may be 'imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood." 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show "either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations." *Id.* As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge "is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]" *Id.* A "lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a violation." *Id.*

B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal

The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian Federation's ("Russia's") further invasion of Ukraine by implementing a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs, atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's strategic ambitions to

exert influence on the world stage. Effective February 24, 2022, BIS imposed expansive controls on aviation-related (e.g., Commerce Control List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, including a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 (section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).⁵ BIS will review any export or reexport license applications for such items under a policy of denial. See section 746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS excluded any aircraft registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia from being eligible for license exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS) (section 740.15 of the EAR), and as part of the same rule, imposed a license requirement for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of all items controlled under CCL Categories 3 through 9 to Belarus.⁶ On April 8, 2022, BIS excluded any aircraft registered in, owned, controlled by, or under charter or lease by Belarus or a national of Belarus from eligibility to use license exception AVS for travel to Russia or Belarus.⁷ Accordingly, any U.S.-origin aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin content, and that is registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Belarus or a national of Belarus, is subject to a license requirement before it can travel to Russia or Belarus.

OEE's request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the initial TDO and the evidence developed over the course of this investigation, which continue to demonstrate disregard for U.S. export controls and the terms of the TDO. Specifically, the initial TDO, issued on June 16, 2022, was based on evidence that Belavia engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by operating multiple aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into Belarus after April 8, 2022 from destinations including but not limited to, Moscow, Russia; St. Petersburg, Russia; Antalya, Turkey; Istanbul, Turkey;

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⁵ 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022).

⁶ 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022).

⁷ 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022).

Tbilisi, Georgia; Batumi, Georgia; Sharjah, United Arab Emirates ("UAE"); and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, without the required BIS authorization.⁸

As discussed in the December 13, 2022 renewal order, evidence presented by BIS indicated that, after the renewal order issued, Belavia continued to operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into Belarusia and/or Russia, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself.⁹ The December 13, 2022 renewal order detailed Belavia's continued operation of flights into Belarus and/or Russia in violation of the EAR, including flights from St. Petersburg and Moscow Russia; Istanbul, Turkey; and Sharjah, UAE.¹⁰

Since that time, Belavia has continued to engage in conduct prohibited by the TDO and Regulations. In its May 18, 2023 request for renewal of the TDO, BIS submitted evidence that Belavia is operating aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into Belarus and/or Russia, in violation of the December 13, 2022 TDO and/or the Regulations. Specifically, BIS's evidence and related investigation demonstrates that Belavia has continued to operate aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into Belarus and/or Russia from/to Hurghada, Egypt; Tbilisi, Georgia; Doha, Qatar; Moscow Russia; Istanbul, Turkey; and Sharjah, UAE.

Information about those flights includes, but is not limited to, the following:

Tail Number	Serial Number	Aircraft Type	Departure/Arrival Cities	Dates
EW-455PA	61421	737-8ZM (B738)	Doha, QA / Minsk, BY	May 27, 2023
EW-455PA	61421	737-8ZM (B738)	Sharjah, AE / Minsk, BY	June 2, 2023
EW-455PA	61421	737-8ZM (B738)	Istanbul, TR / Minsk, BY	June 4, 2023
EW-455PA	61421	737-8ZM (B738)	Moscow, RU / Minsk, BY	June 5, 2023
EW-455PA	61421	737-8ZM (B738)	Minsk, BY / Moscow, RU	June 6, 2023
EW-456PA	61422	737-8ZM (B738)	Kutaisi, GE / Minsk, BY	May 25, 2023
EW-456PA	61422	737-8ZM (B738)	Hurghada, EG / Minsk, BY	June 2, 2023

⁸ Publicly available flight tracking information shows, for example, that on May 10, 2022, serial number (SN) 61423 flew from Moscow, Russia to Minsk, Belarus. On June 14, 2022, SN 61422 flew from Istanbul, Turkey to Minsk, Belarus and SN 40877 flew from Sharjah, United Arab Emirates to Minsk, Belarus.

⁹ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).

¹⁰ Based on publicly available flight tracking information, representative examples include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) on November 15, 2022, serial number (SN) 61421 flew from Moscow, Russia to Minsk, Belarus; (2) on December 9, 2022, SN 61423 flew from St. Petersburg, Russia to Minsk, Belarus and SN 61421 flew from Istanbul, Turkey to Minsk, Belarus; and (3) on November 12, 2022, SN 61423 flew from Sharjah, United Arab Emirates to Minsk, Belarus.

61422	737-8ZM (B738)	Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY	June 3, 2023
61422	737-8ZM (B738)	Istanbul, TR / Minsk, BY	June 4, 2023
61422	737-8ZM (B738)	Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY	June 6, 2023
61423	737-8ZM (B738)	Tbilisi, GE / Minsk, BY	May 28, 2023
61423	737-8ZM (B738)	Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY	May 31, 2023
61423	737-8ZM (B738)	Moscow, RU / Minsk, BY	May 31, 2023
61423	737-8ZM (B738)	Hurghada, EG / Minsk, BY	June 4, 2023
61423	737-8ZM (B738)	Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY	June 5, 2023
26294	737-3Q8 (B733)	Baku, AZ / Minsk, BY	May 29, 2023
26294	737-3Q8 (B733)	Moscow, RU / Minsk, BY	May 30, 2023
26294	737-3Q8 (B733)	Minsk, BY / Moscow, RU	May 31, 2023
26294	737-3Q8 (B733)	Baku, AZ / Minsk, BY	June 4, 2023
26294	737-3Q8 (B733)	Baku, AZ / Minsk, BY	June 6, 2023
35139	737-8K5 (B738)	Moscow, RU / Minsk, BY	May 29, 2023
35139	737-8K5 (B738)	Tbilisi, GE / Minsk, BY	May 30, 2023
35139	737-8K5 (B738)	Istanbul, TR / Minsk, BY	May 31, 2023
35139	737-8K5 (B738)	Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY	June 1, 2023
35139	737-8K5 (B738)	Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY	June 4, 2023
	61422 61422 61423 61423 61423 61423 61423 26294 26294 26294 26294 26294 26294 35139 35139 35139	61422 737-8ZM (B738) 61422 737-8ZM (B738) 61423 737-8ZM (B738) 26294 737-3Q8 (B733) 35139 737-8K5 (B738) 35139 737-8K5 (B738) 35139 737-8K5 (B738)	61422 737-8ZM (B738) Istanbul, TR / Minsk, BY 61422 737-8ZM (B738) Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY 61423 737-8ZM (B738) Tbilisi, GE / Minsk, BY 61423 737-8ZM (B738) Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY 61423 737-8ZM (B738) Moscow, RU / Minsk, BY 61423 737-8ZM (B738) Hurghada, EG / Minsk, BY 61423 737-8ZM (B738) Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY 26294 737-3Q8 (B733) Baku, AZ / Minsk, BY 26294 737-3Q8 (B733) Minsk, BY / Moscow, RU 26294 737-3Q8 (B733) Baku, AZ / Minsk, BY 26294 737-3Q8 (B733) Baku, AZ / Minsk, BY 26294 737-3Q8 (B733) Baku, AZ / Minsk, BY 35139 737-8K5 (B738) Moscow, RU / Minsk, BY 35139 737-8K5 (B738) Istanbul, TR / Minsk, BY 35139 737-8K5 (B738) Antalya, TR / Minsk, BY

III. Findings

Under the applicable standard set forth in section 766.24 of the Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that Belavia has acted in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that such violations have been significant, deliberate and covert; and that given the foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation, there is a likelihood of imminent violations. Therefore, renewal of the TDO is necessary in the public interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to give notice to companies and individuals in the United States and abroad that they should avoid dealing with Belavia in connection with export and reexport transactions involving items subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity subject to the Regulations.

IV. Order

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

FIRST, Belavia Belarusian Airlines, 14A Nemiga str., Minsk, Belarus, 220004, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly,

participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as "item") exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

- A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
- B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

SECOND, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

- A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Belavia any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Belavia of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Belavia acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or

control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Belavia of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

D. Obtain from Belavia in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or

E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Belavia, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Belavia if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

THIRD, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Belavia by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

In accordance with the provisions of sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Belavia may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.

In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may seek

renewal of this Order by filing a written request not later than 20 days before the expiration date.

A renewal request may be opposed by Belavia as provided in section 766.24(d), by filing a

written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, which

must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date of the Order.

A copy of this Order shall be provided to Belavia, and shall be published in the Federal

Register.

This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for 180 days.

Dated: June 7, 2023.

Matthew S. Axelrod,

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.

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